Sunday, 12 May 2013

Why I've decided to write this blog...


As we finished our last exam and congregated in the kitchen to discuss how difficult we thought question 8 was, we realised that we no longer had to sit and revise! We were finally free! 

However... after a few hours of sloping round the flat whilst the rain fell outside, the realisation struck that we were going to be very bored.  So, me and my two flat mates set ourselves a challenge: start a project which will help with your second year and future career. They chose to learn Latin and Russian, and I chose to start writing my own blog and uploading my essays in hopes of feedback and debate to help me improve my skills for university.

So hopefully my first blogging experience will be a beneficial and enjoyable one!

Thanks for reading!




First year of university complete

After sitting my last exam on Friday, I realised I was no longer a fresher!

This also means this blog will be taking a new direction,

My next year modules are:

Autumn:
- Medicine and society pre 17th century
- Tudor and Stuart England
- Victorian Britain

Spring:
- Medicine and society in modern Britain
- From Agincourt to Bosworth: England in the War of the Roses
- Rural England 1660-1900

These will be the themes I will explore on my blog, hopefully I can make them as interesting as they sound!!

Thanks for reading 
 
My history highlights of the first year at university:


- The excellent opportunity to meet and hear what Historian and Holocaust survivor Ladislaus Löb had to say on his experience Bergen-Belsen concentration camp and how the 1938 Kindertransport saved his life.

- UEA's very own Dr Jessica Sharkey who delivered a fantastic lecture on Thomas Wolsey's connections with East Anglia which provided an interesting and entertaining insight.

- Thursday night 'screenings' for our Holocaust in History module where we were shown footage from the archives on the first reactions to the holocaust. Many students were quite emotional as the subject really hit home, and a further understanding on the atrocities set in.

Above: Ladislaus Löb representing the Holocaust Educational Trust


Above: Sounds interesting...

Saturday, 11 May 2013

Was there a ‘decline of magic’ in Europe after the mid seventeenth century?


It has been argued by Levack that ‘by the mid sixteenth century the early modern European stereotype of witchcraft had been fully formed’[1], and was instilled in people through their belief in God. The problem with such faith is that ‘once their initial premises are accepted, no subsequent discovery will shake the believer’s faith’[2]. On studying religion of the Early Modern period it would appear that systems of belief possess a resilience which makes them virtually immune to external argument. However, for the practice of magic to see a decline there must have been vital factors involved in changing people’s mindsets. Thomas argues that ‘magic … has valuable side-effects. It lessens anxiety, relieves pent-up frustration, and makes the practitioner feel that he is doing something positive towards the solution of his problem’[3]. Thus, it could be argued that the only way to see a decline in magic was for there to be ways in which people could feel in control of their everyday problems, from the faith in potentialities supported by scientific aspiration to more practical every day methods of taking control of ones situation. This essay will address four key areas highlighted in Keith Thomas’s work to assess how intellectual developments, new technology and improvements in material life and new aspirations[4] helped lessen the popular practice and belief of magic.

An important reason for the changes in popular opinion on magic is the intellectual developments which were emerging throughout the Seventeenth century. Thomas argues that change in religiously ingrained beliefs on the practice of magic ‘had to arise from outside the system altogether’[5]. This system was science. Before long, it was impossible for people to deny that there were natural laws outside of religion which had an effect on the world and strongly weakened the ideas of miracles and things alike. Whilst originally, magic and science had advanced side by side with the rise in cunning folk, who treated patients using herbal remedies, charms and amulets, a modern society would argue that this was not science. At the time of the cunning folk they were seen as well-respected medical professionals who brought hope and instilled confidence in their patients and their relatives, who otherwise felt they had no control over their situation. The particular methods the cunning folk used often involved ‘reciting certain sayings…or rituals’[6], these techniques often helped to calm the patient down but were not of medical value. However, some of the ingredients they used in their remedies ‘were understood to work – and, indeed, did work[7] . For example, Lindemann argues that ‘some herbal remedies undoubtedly alleviated symptoms. Willow bark tea, for instance...reduces fever' and later 'In the nineteenth century, chemists discovered that willow contains salicvlates, the active ingredient in aspirin.'[8] So the wise women and cunning folk were at times truly beneficial, but the fact that they existed brought an element of control and hope to sick patients or families at a time of turmoil. However, ‘this union of magic and science was short lived’, possibly due to the declining need for cunning folk, as ‘'Diaries and correspondence abundantly testify to...how often...remedies travelled and changed hands’ and how remedies ‘moved quickly among the literate and the illiterate alike' [9] showing that once the medical ideas were established, many felt capable to practice them without the aid of another. Furthermore, a number of intellectual advances made within the early seventeenth century. These advancements began to instil within Early Modern society something which was still quite new: faith in humanity. Due to the potentialities of scientific experiment, people no longer felt hopeless, and even though their problems had not yet been solved, they became confident that they could be controlled and maybe one day combated by humans. One of the most important developments of the new science was that the forces such as Magnetism and electricity could now be explained in mechanical terms rather than just as an outside magical influence - which, left unexplained, led people to blame forces of the supernatural. Furthermore, this new and more developed scientific knowledge began to lead to a demand for empirical evidence to prove all beliefs. This led to a rise in demonstrations, one such is stated by Gaskill, that stories such as 'the king sending his physician William Harvey...in order to study a witch’s familiar' circulated, and argues that whilst these stories were usually told for entertainment, 'a seed of change had been sown'[10]. People were no longer confined to the explanations of wise women and cunning folk, but were assisted by the new science, towards a mental change which led people to believe that holding faith in demonstration and reason would someday find the answers. The role of ancient figures was vital to this too, as they acted as the foundation on which Early Modern scientists and intellectuals were to base their opinions and methods of investigation. Figures such as Epicurus and Lucretius ‘showed that the course of the world could be explained without invoking divine intervention’[11], showing that the new ideas of experiment and reason could be linked back to the work of ancient, respected authorities - for example, Galenic theory which was being referred to throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The role early modern scientific authorities were vital in the decline of magic, as the substantial evidence and theories that they produced now made witch trials very difficult to prosecute, and discredited things such as astrology which could now be challenged with scientific theories. Furthermore, the proof that they produced and the research they carried out was enough to give the population some hope, and Byrne argues that these were the catalysts behind the ’emergence of ways of looking at the world which no longer viewed it as the sphere of the finely-balanced battle between the Lord and the Devil...but rather as the place in which systematic and rational investigation brings the truth into the light and banishes the darkness of ignorance'[12] He then elaborates, by saying that the natural world could now be viewed 'as a place which was to some extent within our control and within the limits of our comprehension'[13], marking a change in mindset assisted by the new science.

In terms of material life within society, things began to improve, from the population pressure easing off to the improvements in agriculture and trade, there was far less of a burden on the public. It has been argued that ‘general circumstances of this kind must have done something to increase human self-confidence’[14].  This improving confidence in human control was supported by the developments of new technology. For example, printed news sheets were a development of the early sixteenth century  which not only aided the increase in popular literacy which would have allowed a wider range of people to gain access to the latest scientific advancements, and be able to process these into their daily life. Furthermore, a vital part of the decline of magic was due to media like advertisements in the paper which combated the everyday problems in which people usually turned to magic. For example, Keith Thomas highlights that there were sections for ‘lost property…lost dogs’ and ‘stolen horses’ which would have restored an element of human control in the management of these everyday issues, as it offered a practical solution to the misfortune, rather than it leading people to turn to prayers, saints, amulets and charms. Subsequently, ‘the need for the cunning man was accordingly reduced’[15] – and similarly to how the rise of self-help regarding illness occurred, cunning folk also became less popular when a practical method of helping one another out of everyday misfortunes was established.
 Another improvement which benefitted society was the development of the social sciences, in which ‘Instead of accusing witches’ people could attribute misfortunes ‘to the way in which his parents had brought him up, or the social system into which he had been born’[16]. Furthermore, the rise of the social sciences brought with it the emergence of words such as ‘co-incidence’, which highlighted that events could happen at random and could be calculated using the mathematics that is probability. This awareness of the fact that misfortunes could be attributed to simple bad luck, and that there were now ways of taking control of your misfortunate situations allowed people to relax somewhat.


 This leads me on to discuss the new aspirations within the mid seventeenth century, which Thomas highlights in his work. There was a significant urge to experiment, shown by the introduction of new drugs such as quinine for the treatment of Malaria which still exists today. There also emerged a practical and optimistic attitude, in which the idea of self-help was central. ‘Seventeenth century towns took increasingly strenuous precautions to protect themselves’ and ‘there was nothing passive or fatalistic’[17] about this protection, it simply represented people taking matters into their own hands. Thomas argues that these new aspirations led men to become ‘more prepared to combine impotence in the face of current misfortune with the faith that a technical solution would one day be found’[18]. Whilst this might seem like a radical and modern idea for the time based on what we know was actually achieved within the early modern period, we can again trace back to the ancient work of Hippocrates, to argue that this trust in potentialities was not completely unheard of, as even when he said that epilepsy did not have supernatural causes, he did not provide any alternative causes or cures for epilepsy, but for some reason (perhaps due to his authoritative intellectual position) people trusted this opinion and were content with waiting, as they were faithful that one day evidence would emerge to prove this theory. There is also evidence to show that reasons for change in magical beliefs can be attributed to changes in the minds of the people, and not science alone, for if this was the case then what encouraged the scientists themselves to recognise a need for change in the beginning? The work by Galileo, Descartes and others did not simply occur due to co-incidence, but due to other factors, which anthropologists have drawn attention to: ‘the importance of literacy, the trade-travel complex, Protestantism, the clash of cultures in the movement to the ‘Open society’ of modern science and technology’ and there has been an argument that science emerged as a result of the curiosities brought on by these changes within society.

This leads me to conclude, the developments of the later seventeenth century were all too late in making the change which resulted in the decline of magic, and the scepticism of witchcraft and magic emerged long before the mid seventeenth century.  However, whilst Thomas points out that ‘many of the sceptical and anti-magical attitudes were already present in the Lollard works of the fifteenth century’[19], I would finalise my argument by saying that if it was not for intellectual changes, alterations in technology and material life and forthcoming aspirations in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries then we may not have seen this emergence of a new faith in the potentialities of human initiative. For a mental change to occur, people have to believe that something new is developing, even if it has not yet happened, and whether they support this development is completely dependent on the premise that there is something else for them to fixate their beliefs on. So I would oppose the idea that other factors of the time highlighted in early paragraphs were futile, as I think it is factors such as the potentialities offered by intellectuals who warranted a relaxation and thus decline of the practice and belief of magic, and without them we may not have seen such change in mentalities.



Bibliography

J.M. Byrne, Religion and the Enlightenment: From Descartes to Kant, (London 1996)
M. Gaskill, Witchfinders: A Seventeenth-Century English Tragedy, (UK and USA 2005)
B.P. Levack, The Witchcraft Sourcebook, (USA and Canada 2004)
M. Lindemann, Medicine and Society in Early Modern Europe, (Cambridge 2010)
A. Macfarlane, Civility and the Decline of Magic (Cambridge 2002)
K. Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic, (London 1971)
M.E Wiesner-Hanks, Early Modern Europe 1450-1789 (USA 2006)



[1] edited by Brian P. Levack, The Witchcraft Sourcebook, (USA and Canada 2004), page 69 
[2] Keith Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic, (London 1971), page 767
[3] K. Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic, page 775
[4] K. Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic, page 767
[5] K. Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic, page 768
[6] Merry E. Wiesner-Hanks, Early Modern Europe, 1450-1789, (USA 2006), pages 49-50
[7] M.E Wiesner-Hanks, Early Modern Europe, pages 49-50
[8] Mary Lindemann, Medicine and Society in Early Modern Europe, (Cambridge 2010), page 113
[9] M. Lindemann, Medicine and Society, page 122
[10] Malcom Gaskill, Witchfinders: A Seventeenth-Century English Tragedy, (UK and USA 2005), page 193
[11] K. Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic, page 773
[12] James M. Byrne, Religion and the Enlightenment: From Descartes to Kant, (London 1996), page 19
[13] J.M Byrne, Religion and the Enlightenment, page 19
[14] K. Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic, page 778
[15] K. Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic, page 779
[16] K. Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic, page 784
[17] K. Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic, page 786
[18] K. Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic, page 790
[19] Alan Macfarlane, Civility and the decline of magic (Cambridge 2002) available at: www.alanmacfarlane.com/TEXTS/THOMAS/pdf [accessed 11/03/13]

Why were there so many revolutions in 1848-1849?


The word ‘revolution’ can be defined as ‘a forcible overthrow of a government or social order for a new system’ or ‘a dramatic and wide-reaching change in conditions, attitudes or operation’[1]. This essay will explore the causes of the 1848 revolutions and discuss whether or not they can all be labelled ‘revolutions’ as not enough changed as a result of them. The 1848 revolutions were caused by a cumulative effect of various key factors, which reached boiling point first in France, and then in some other European countries. This essay also addresses another issue: based on the definition of a revolution, whether or not there were in fact ‘so many’ revolutions as stated in the question, or whether these were just an introduction of new ideas and political movements. 

R.J.W Evans would argue that there are ‘5 key concepts’ in assessing why the revolutions took place, these were; ‘Widespread dissatisfaction with the political leadership; demand for more participation and democracy; demands of working class; upsurge of nationalism and regrouping of reactionary forces based in royalty, aristocracy, army and peasants’[2]. On the other hand, Droz would argue that two key factors were the ‘Triangular class struggle between 2 sections of middle class’ (the grande and petite bourgeoisie) and ‘absence of liberty’[3]. This view is upheld by Stearns who reaffirms ‘There was something of a crisis of the middle classes during the 1840’s, and without it the revolutions probably could not have occurred’.[4]
One view of why there were revolts during the years 1848-1849 is that they were due to revolution being a tradition from 1789 and 1730, and upon a theme of discontent people felt obliged to turn to uprising. Furthermore, the failure of previous revolutions could have been the inspiration for European citizens to attempt to achieve their aims again. Other important factors include the increasing literacy rates within the middle class, as this meant that they drove political change; in contrast to the revolutions of 1789 which were driven by the Sans-Culottes. This is supported by Lewis Namier’s view that the 1848 revolutions were that of ‘the intellectuals’, he presents the idea that:
‘The European Continent responded to the impulses and trends of the revolution with a remarkable uniformity despite the differences of language and race, and in the political, social and economic level of the countries concerned: but then the common denominator was ideological, and even literary, and there was a basic unity and cohesion in the intellectual world of the European Continent, such as usually asserts itself in the peak periods of its spiritual development.’[5] 
Some people, such as Tocqueville, argue that the economic crisis was a reason for the revolutios and was ‘unleashed in 1846, becoming violent in 1847, which shook the country to its foundations’[6] because previous revolutions had emerged from the same issues. However, we must note that the causes of the revolution cannot have been purely economic because the crises were in 1845 and 1847 so revolution would have occurred sooner than it did. Therefore, it must be a conjunction of economic crisis alongside political discontent.
Instead, one would argue that it is difficult to point in the direction of a sole factor when considering the causation of the revolutions, and they can only be explained as an accumulation of popular discontent, revolutionary tradition and an increased awareness of political freedom.
This leads onto the importance of Nationalism, defined as patriotic feeling, principles or efforts’[7], acting as a driving force behind the 1848 revolutions. Karol Berger argues that ‘Nationalism is a peculiarly modern way of legitimising political power as exercised in the name of a nation which, in East - central Europe at least, was usually defined in terms of its culture. Since culture is the intellectuals’ domain, Nationalism confers on this group the enviable role of the legitimising priesthoods which legitimised the god-derived powers of pre-modern rulers.’[8]
Furthermore, it has been argued that ‘The primary significance of the 1848 revolutions was to assert strongly the principle of nationality as a powerful force in Europe’[9] and displayed the authority of the common people to the rulers, encouraging them to implement reforms in following years.

A main area of change, which appeared to be the catalyst for the rest of the European revolutions was France, supported by Strandmann’s idea that ‘It was the signal from Paris in February which triggered the publicly voiced demands for reforms which found mass support in the Habsburg lands, in Italy and in Germany’[10]. France, who was influenced by the rise of liberalism, believed that people should rule themselves. It was also apparent that people hated the policies of Guizot and all insisted on Guizot’s resignation’[11] after his suppression of the  ‘champagne des banquets’ which were meetings driven by nationalist and republican ideas. The French wanted universal suffrage amongst men, and the abolishment of the privilege of only being able to vote if you paid high taxes. The disturbances in France have been named ‘The French second republic’ and on the fall of Louis Phillipe it has been said that ‘never in France’s history had a monarchy fallen so easily or with so little regret’[12], showing the significance of the revolt in influencing others. Overall the French Revolution of 1848 was a success, perhaps because it occurred due to long term grievances that were at the heart of daily life within French society. Furthermore, this particular revolution had won the first goals it had set out to achieve.
There were also revolts in Italy, a place where there had been previous issues and demonstrations over the Bourbon monarchy. This was marked by outbreak in Sicily in 1848 which produced an independent state, but despite this achievement of a democratic and liberal system, it only lasted a short time of sixteen months.
In the Germanic states, revolution consisted of some action being taken through assemblies and demonstrations in the South and West, which were led by educated students and intellectuals
and who presented a set of demands for national unity; freedom of press and freedom of assembly. However, the uprisings were poorly organised and there was a class divide amongst the Germans (middle and working split) and this ultimately led to their downfall and defeat by the conservative aristocracy.
Another focal point during the years 1848-1849 was The Habsburg Empire, which was influenced by pressure from other countries it manifested itself in petitions and demonstrations due to people being discontented with the censorship and police supervision. Furthermore, the desire to overthrow Metternich was apparent ‘They informed the Emperor of the crowd’s feelings and demands, in particular of the intensity of the popular hatred for Metternich’ and ‘Ferdinand could hear the chants of the crowd.  From this he could tell that above all they wanted the dismissal of Metternich’[13].
Stearns argues that middle class liberals in Vienna ‘sincerely sought the classic liberal demands: freedom of press and speech, abolition of arbitrary imprisonment, and so on’ but ‘they were vague about how to secure their goals and were decidedly unrevolutionary’[14], allowing for questioning on whether this change can genuinely be labelled a ‘revolution’.

Whilst popular discontent swept across much of Europe, it is possible to argue that there were not so many ‘revolutions’ as is interpreted, as we must acknowledge that they failed to reach Britain, Russian Empire, The Ottoman Empire, and Switzerland. Furthermore, Sweden and Norway were little affected. The fact that four of the great imperial powers did not become involved in the 1848 revolutions could show that they were not as powerful as is often interpreted.
Also, some would say that the movements did not fully achieve the aims they set out to, and ‘one may say that all the revolutions which a century ago swept the European continent in a spectacular kind of "chain reaction" proved abortive. All of them were cut short in one way or another. No dynasty disappeared except the one which had been a "bourgeois" dynasty (une utilite) anyway. No major frontier was altered, and few castles were destroyed’[15].

This leads me to conclude: The only lasting accomplishment from the revolutions was the abolition of serfdom in the Austo-Hungarian Empire, and ‘The dreams of social and political change anticipated were as optimistic as the new order was short lived… by the summer of 1849 all former rulers were back in place’[16]. There were far more countries within Europe which failed to achieve their aims in the revolutions of 1848 than those who succeeded, and if nothing significantly changed within Europe as a result of the changes of 1848, they cannot be considered widespread revolutions, and are merely an introduction of new ideas. Whilst it is possible to question whether these movements were revolutionary, the 1848 revolutions certainly had an impact as they showed the middle classes driving political change, and the spread of Nationalism gripping nations, and to summarise, it is apparent that there is no single factor in causing the 1848 revolutions, but instead they occurred due to an accumulation of popular discontent, revolutionary tradition, the rise of intellectuals and an increased awareness of political freedom from the rise of Nationalism. It is clear to see that the revolutions were sparked off by those in France during 1848, which was the definitive catalyst for revolt in other countries. Without the growth of Paris and influence of France on other countries, the revolutions across Europe may never have occurred. The strength of the French Revolution of 1848 has been emphasised in the powerful quote by Rapport: ‘Word of the February days in Paris spread like a dynamic pulse and Electrified Europe’[17].


Bibliography

Books:
T. Baycroft, Nationalism in Europe, (Cambridge University Press 1998), Page 17
R. Evans and H. Strandmann, The revolutions in Europe 1848-1849 from reform to reaction, (Oxford University Press 2000), page 4, 5
D. Jacques, Europe between revolutions 1815-1848, (1967), page 252
L. Namier, 1848: The revolution of the intellectuals, (Oxford University Press, USA, 1992) page 3-4
N. Pelling, Access to history: The Habsburg Empire 1815-1918, (Hodder and Stoughton Educational, Great Britain, 1996), page 44

J. Rink and J. Samson, Chopin Studies 2 (Cambridge University Press 1994) page 74
P. Stearns, The Revolutions of 1848 (Great Britain 1974), page 12, 73, 77, 99
A. Tocqueville, Recollections: The French Revolution Of 1848, (Transaction Publishers, New Jersey, 1987) page xvi


Journals:
H. Rothfels, ‘1848: One Hundred Years After’, The Journal of Modern History, Volume XX Number 4, (December 1948), page 1 (
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1871060)


Websites:
Google Books (
http://books.google.co.uk/books)

http://www.jstor.org accessed 30/10/12

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1848_revolutions accessed 27/10/12

Definition of ‘Revolution’, http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/revolution?q=revolution, accessed 26/10/12

Definition of ‘Nationalism’, http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/nationalism?q=nationalism, accessed 26/10/12



[1] Definition of ‘Revolution’, http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/revolution?q=revolution, accessed 26/10/12
[2] Edited by R.J.W Evans and Hartmut pagge von Strandmann, The revolutions in Europe 1848-1849 from reform to reaction, (Oxford University Press 2000), page 4
[3] Jacques Droz, Europe between revolutions 1815-1848, (1967), page 252
[4] Peter N. Stearns, The Revolutions of 1848 (Great Britain 1974), page 12
[5] Sir Lewis Bernstein Namier, 1848: The revolution of the intellectuals, (Oxford University Press, USA, 1992) page 3-4
[6] Alexis de Tocqueville, Recollections: The French Revolution Of 1848, (Transaction Publishers, New Jersey, 1987) page xvi
[7] Definition of ‘Nationalism’, http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/nationalism?q=nationalism, accessed 26/10/12
[8] Edited by John Rink and Jim Samson, Chopin Studies 2 (Cambridge University Press 1994) page 74
[9] Timothy Baycroft, Nationalism in Europe, (Cambridge University Press 1998), Page 17
[10] (Ed) Evans and Strandmann, The revolutions in Europe 1848-1849 from reform to reaction, page 5
[11] Stearns, The Revolutions of 1848, page 73
[12] Stearns, The Revolutions of 1848, page 77
[13] Nick Pelling, Access to history: The Habsburg Empire 1815-1918, (Hodder and Stoughton Educational, Great Britain, 1996), page 44
[14] Stearns, The Revolutions of 1848, page 99
[15] Hans Rothfels, ‘1848: One Hundred Years After’, The Journal of Modern History, Volume XX Number 4, (December 1948), page 1 (http://www.jstor.org/stable/1871060)
[16] Baycroft, Nationalism in Europe, Page 17
[17] Mike Rapport, 1848 Year of Revolution ( Great Britain 2008), page 57

Why did a viable fascist movement not emerge in Britain?



Fascism is ‘an authoritarian or nationalistic right-wing system of government and social organisation’[1], and in general use refers to extreme right-wing, authoritarian or intolerant views or practices. It has been said that the term originated with the rise of Mussolini, and it tends to relate to the belief that one ethnic group are supreme. In order to answer the question it is vital to define other key words within the question, as the meaning of the words could be debated amongst historians. In more general terms, ‘viable’ is said to mean ‘capable of working successfully’[2], and ‘movement’ is said to mean ‘a group of people working together to advance their shared political, social, or artistic ideas’[3]. The idea of Britain is difficult to establish because ‘Since the 1950s Britain has experienced a period of accelerated social and cultural change’[4]. In this essay I will argue that Britain did not see a viable fascist movement, and there is a multi-causal explanation for this. I will attempt to highlight the main reasons why Britain did not embrace a fascist movement whilst the modern period saw other parts of Europe where issues with fascism were arising, for example Nazi Germany and fascist Italy, bearing in mind the above definitions and interpretations.

In trying to assess why a viable fascist movement did not emerge within Britain I will analyse the British culture, economy, politics and other factors and why the state of each of these meant that the need for a rigid and extremist government never emerged.
Firstly, fascism failed because economically Britain has never been in such a dire situation where it required the intervention or allowed widespread support for a rigid and strict leadership, Even during times where unemployment was high. Thorpe argues that the unemployed were ‘much more likely to respond to the reformist policies of most trade unions and the Labour party than radical solutions.’[5] However, the 1930s did see an economic depression and there was still little support for a fascist movement. This demonstrates that there were other factors involved in answering the question of why Britain remained free from a fascist dictatorship within the modern period, for example culture.
It has been said that the British are more ‘tolerant of outsiders’ as they ‘marked their commitment to the rules of the democratic game’[6], and it was these principles on democracy, and the focus on international corporation rather than nationalism which allowed Britain to keep fascism at bay. Geographically, Britain’s border was in a strong position against attack, whereas Europe’s borders could be changing all the time as their territories were so close to one another, possibly explaining the stronger fear of outsiders in Europe as opposed to Britain. Furthermore, it could be argued that Britain was more tolerant of so-called ‘outsiders’ as the first migrants came to Britain in the 1950s. Whilst large-scale immigration largely finished in the 1970s as a result of laws being imposed which restricted immigration, I would argue that the British were now able to recognise cultural diversity without the onset of Xenophobia. This, coupled with a mostly stable economy, meant that there was never a need for the British to scapegoat a minority group, unlike the events which unfolded in the latter half of the 20th Century within Germany, which led to large scale persecution and genocide of the Jews.  
There were factors of the political system which hindered any progress of the fascist movement in Britain, for example, the voting system. Britain, unlike other countries voted using the ‘first-past-the-post’ system, meaning that votes were based on regional collective votes rather than individual votes in proportional representation voting. This meant that the widely scattered extremist voters within regions around the country could not become concentrated into dangerous figures, but were instead outvoted by the majority of their region.

Whilst I would argue that a viable fascist movement never emerged successfully within Britain, it must be acknowledged that there was a presence of fascist groups there within the modern period. The first instance of some right wing activity was with Sir Oswald Mosely who established the British Union of Fascists (BUF) Mosely was said to be
have ‘a fatal flaw in his character, on overwhelming arrogance and an unshakable conviction that he was born to rule’[7], showing the kind of self-assured man he was. The BUF was created after Mosely met Mussolini ‘in January 1932… and was impressed by Mussolini's achievements and when he returned to England he disbanded the New Party and replaced it with the British Union of Fascists’.[8]. This shows that the English idea of fascism originated from the Italian example, and it could be argued that because Mussolini’s regime was based on the problems within Italy, this could explain why Mosely’s attempt to mirror Mussolini and his ideologies failed. Mosely became involved in politics especially during the 1930s, and attempted to gain support from the unemployed at this time of economic difficulty. Thurlow argues that Mosely’s campaign ‘failed to convince the nation that authoritarian methods were necessary to solve Britain's economic crisis' and it 'was blamed for fomenting the violence and public disorder which became associated with its activities in the 1930'[9] Thorpe also comments on the ‘instability and rootlessness of the movement’[10]. This supports my argument that whilst fascist activity emerged at some points within British history, a viable fascist movement did not.  Thurlow goes on to argue that 'the British economy staged a revival in that decade... new industries and house building in the south and east of the country led to a growth rate', showing that even whilst Britain experienced economic depression, aside from the Lancashire cotton farmers, there was never enough support across Britain for the BUF to take control.  Additionally, this source shows that Britain recovered at such a rapid rate that there was never widespread discontentment for a long enough period for people to turn to the extreme and ‘last resort’ solutions.  

Although many things changed between the 1930s and the early 1990s, it was to the general publics’ panic, when in 1993 the BNP’s ‘party's candidate... won a seat on the council in a by-election'[11]. There was relief when they 'lost it at the full election the following year'[12]. Despite the panic caused by the media, these fascist movements had a bad reputation and were not taken seriously by the masses. Furthermore, in terms of leadership and organisation, there was a general failure of any real organised fascist movement. Driver argues that ‘Evidence suggests that older people are also more likely to vote BNP, as are those with few or no qualifications'[13]. This could show that those who do vote for the BNP tend to be uneducated or have somewhat outdated ideas, possibly indicating why no real organised movements have been roused within Britain.

The final part of my argument will examine other European countries and attempt to explain why they experienced a fascist movement, and how their circumstances differed from Britain’s, in order to establish a common cause amongst the other countries which Britain lacked.
Firstly, Italy experienced fascism with the rise of Mussolini. After World War 1 there was a poor economy, which subsequently led to large divisions within society. This coupled with an extreme fear of communism, forced people to panic and lean to the extreme right to prevent a feared left wing government from taking hold.
My second example is the fascist movement within Germany. People were tired of their quality of life, and similarly to the economic issues within Italy, there seemed to be no answers for the economic crisis that was at hand. ‘At the end of the war ushered in the first truly liberal political regime (the Weimar Republic) but deprived it of much-needed political legitimacy in the eyes of large sectors of the population, as it identified the system with national humiliation, political weakness, ineffiency and social division,’[14]. This perceived weakness of the Weimar Republic from the offset combined with their lack of answers for the economic depression in Germany led people to turn to the Nazi party, as they finally answered their grievances and offered a solution to the countries issues. Additionally, (and again, similarly to Italy) they promised to end the communist threat, in particular, as this worried those such as successful and powerful businessmen.
I would argue that from looking at these two examples of fascism within Europe, Britain does not fall under either category politically or economically. It is mainly accepted that Britain was mainly successful economically, and was never majorly threatened by communism. This would completely eradicate the need for a far right governmental force.

To conclude, it is important to understand that in the case of Britain, a viable fascist movement did not emerge for a number of reasons. Therefore, we have a multi-causal explanation which is a combination of economic stability, British tolerance, lack of organised movement, and the workings of the political voting system.
In looking to the future, we should observe moments such as 1993-95 where there were moral panics that the BNP could gain genuine support, Driver’s argues ‘while it is clear that a large majority of the electorate are hostile to far right parties - and would never vote for them - nearly 20 per cent of the public said that they might vote for the BNP in the future’.  From this, I think although there are a number of people within Britain today who would consider voting for the BNP, due to things like rising acts of religious and political extremism, there is something significant about British society which prevents them from taking their thoughts one step further to actively voting. It could be that we live in a multicultural and ethnically diverse society, and that although there is some prejudice against minorities, those minorities have become such an integral part of the society that taking action against them would be impossible and absurd. Additionally, there has never been a dire enough situation within modern Britain which would give cause to the scapegoating and subsequent persecution of one minority group which seems to be a common theme within examples of the rise of fascism in rest of Europe.

Bibliography
C. Blamires, World Fascism: A Historical Encyclopedia, Volume 2, (USA 2006)

D. Christopher, British Culture: An Intoduction, (London 1999)

 E. Cronin, The Failure of British Fascism: The Far Right and the Fight for Political Recognition, (Britain 1996)

S. Driver, Understanding British Party Politics, (Cambridge 2011)

J. Lee, Jennie Lee explained her views on Oswald Mosley available at:
http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/Pfascists.htm (accessed 01/02/13)

Oxford Dictionaries, ‘Definition of ‘fascism’ available at: http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/fascism (accessed 01/02/13)

Oxford Dictionaries, ‘Definition of ‘viable’ available at: http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/viable (accessed 01/02/13)

Oxford Dictionaries, Definition of ‘movement’ available at: http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/movement?q=movement (accessed 01/02/13)

Spartacus Educational, Article on British Union of Fascists available at: http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/Pfascists.htm

A. Thorpe, The Failure of Political Extremism In Inter-War Britain, (Exeter 1988)

R. Thurlow, Fascism in Britain: A History, 1918-1945, (London 1998)


[1] Definition of ‘fascism’ available at: http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/fascism (accessed 01/02/13)
[2] Definition of ‘viable’ available at: http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/viable (accessed 01/02/13)
[3] Definition of ‘movement’ available at: http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/movement?q=movement (accessed 01/02/13)
[4]  David Christopher, British Culture: An Intoduction, (London 1999), page 1
[5] Andrew Thorpe, The Failure of Political Extremism In Inter-War Britain, (Exeter 1988), page 69
[6] Ed. Ed Cronin, The Failure of British Fascism The Far Right and the Fight for Political Recognition: The Far Right and the Fight for Political Recognition, (Britain 1996), page 54

[7] Jennie Lee explained her views on Oswald Mosley available at: http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/Pfascists.htm (accessed 01/02/13)

[8] Article on British Union of Fascists available at: http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/Pfascists.htm (accessed 01/02/13)
[9] Richard Thurlow, Fascism in Britain: A History, 1918-1945, (London 1998), page 62
[10] Thorpe, The Failure of Political Extremism In Inter-War Britain, page 70
[11] Stephen Driver, Understanding British Party Politics, (Cambridge 2011), page 144
[12] Driver, Understanding British Party Politics, page 144
[13]Driver, Understanding British Party Politics, page 145
[14] Cyprian Blamires, World Fascism: A Historical Encyclopedia, Volume 2, (USA 2006), page 509